This study estimates what fraction of the rise in family income inequality in the United States between 1968 and 2000 is accounted for by the change in each of the family income components, such as wages, employment, hours of work of family heads and spouses, family structure, and other incomes. The increased disparities in other incomes and labor supply account for 29% and 28%, respectively, of the rise in the difference in incomes between the top 10% and bottom 10% families. Structural changes in wages, largely regarded as the major culprit for the increase in income inequality, explain less than a quarter of the rise in the measure of family income inequality. Changing fractions of families with both husband and wife and changes in the composition of the income sources account for 11% and 16%, respectively, of the widening income gap. The relative importance of the effect of changing labor supply declined over time, while that of wage changes increased. For the upper half of the income distribution, wage changes were the dominant cause of the increase in the gap between the richest 10th and middle-income families. In sharp contrast, changes in labor supply and other incomes were the principal causes of the growing distance between the poor and middle-income families for the lower half of the income distribution.
Introduction
Rising income inequality is one of the most remarkable features of the US economy in this era of globalization and IT revolution. 1 Over the last couple of decades, an extensive literature has been accumulated regarding the patterns and causes of the growing 254 C. Lee disparities in incomes. The primary focus of recent studies has been on changing dispersions in individual wages between and within various demographic groups possessing different human capital attributes. Some major explanations for the widening of the wage gap between high-and low-skilled workers are as follows: technological changes, international trade, transfers abroad of production activities, inflow of less-skilled immigrants, degraded quality of education, decline of labor unions, and deregulations of industries. 2 Although now, thanks to the large body of evidence suggested in previous studies, how the wage structure transformed over time and what produced the change are much better understood, it is less clear how the increased income inequality affected the distribution of the wellbeing of individuals. In particular, it is striking that only a few studies have rigorously documented the changing distribution of family income. Given that family members jointly make decisions on labor supply, pool their earnings, and share family resources, family income is perhaps a better measure of the material wellbeing of a person than his or her own wages. As in the case of individual wages and earnings, the family income disparity in the United States has sharply widened over the last several decades. 3 One cannot simply assume that rising wage inequality is the main story behind the increase in family income inequality because family income is determined by many other factors in addition to individual wages. These factors include employment and hours worked of each family member, family structure, and non-labor incomes.
Only a small number of studies have paid attention to the effect of changing labor supply on income inequality. Burtless (1990 Burtless ( , 1993 and Moffitt (1990) reported that the growth in annual earnings inequality for male workers during the 1970s and 1980s was primarily due to growing inequality in hourly wage rates. On the other hand, Haveman (1996) suggested that the increase in earnings inequality between 1973 and 1988 among working-age men was largely produced by the increased variability in the amount that potential breadwinners worked. 4 Hyslop (2001) reported that among married working couples, behavioral labor supply responses to wage changes explained 20% of the rise in family earnings inequality in the early 1980s. 5 Lee (2001) computed that changes in the labor market activity of family heads accounted for half the increased gap between families in the top and bottom income deciles between 1969 and 1989. 6 Previous studies on income inequality have largely focused on male workers. However, patterns of individual labor force participation and hours of work need to be understood in the context of joint decisions made by family members. For example, if income effect is strong, the fewer working hours or lower wages of a family head could be supplemented by increased hours worked by the spouse or other family members. The existing literature is nearly silent about how changes in employment and in the hours of work of the family head and his spouse jointly contributed to the family income inequality. Burtless (1993) estimated the contribution of employment and hours changes by comparing the actual and counterfactual changes in the Gini-ratio for the periods [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] . However, his study dealt with individual earnings of men and women rather than family earnings. 7 Hyslop (2001) found that married men and women tended to increase (decrease) the number of hours in which they worked in response to the diminished (increased) earnings of their spouses. Based exclusively on a sample of employed couples, however, the study failed to provide evidence regarding the effects of the changing patterns of employment on family income inequality.
A few studies enable us to predict how the changing patterns of work affected family income inequality. Decline in employment was particularly severe among the lesseducated and low-wage men between 1967 and 1988 (Juhn 1992) . The rise in two-earner couples has been more pronounced in families in which the husband's earnings were higher (Cancian, Danziger, and Gottschalk 1993) . Employment and earnings gains have been greatest for wives of middle-and high-wage men (Juhn and Murphy 1997) . The inter-spousal correlation of wages, hours of work, and employment increased between 1979 and 1987 (Blackburn and Bloom 1995 . Finally, as noted above, the intertemporal substitution effect of a wage change dominated its income effect for married women in the early 1980s (Hyslop 2001) . These changes in employment and earnings patterns of men and women should have increased the family income inequality to some extent. However, the magnitude of the joint effects is unclear.
The purpose of this paper is to examine what fraction of the rise in family income inequality in the United States between 1968 and 2000 can be accounted for by the changes in each of the following components of the family income: (1) employment of the head, (2) hours of work of the head, (3) wage rate of the head, (4) marital status of the head, (5) employment of the spouse, (6) hours of work of the spouse, (7) wage rate of the spouse, (8) income from sources other than the earnings of the head and the spouse, and (9) fraction of the family income coming from a particular source. More specifically, I estimate what percentage of the change in the measure of family income inequality (defined in this study as the difference in the log of the average income between families in different income deciles) is attributable to the changes in the above factors for the period between 1969 and 1999 and the three sub-periods, namely, 1969-1979, 1979-1989, and 1989-1999. This study is distinct from other studies in many respects. First, this study explicitly considers at the same time all potentially important factors of the total family income inequality. To my knowledge, this study is the first to combine the effects of wage changes, employment, hours worked, family structure, and composition of income into a single decomposition framework. Second, my study compares results based on several different samples of the populations, that is (1) all families headed by persons aged 18 to 64, (2) all households including families and single householders, (3) families headed by persons aged 25 to 55, and (4) families headed by males aged 25 to 55. Using alternative samples not only enables me to avoid sample-selection biases but also helps interpret the results more accurately. Finally, my study covers the entire three decades during which the family income inequality increased, and compares the results for each decade within the period under study. This will help understand how the mechanisms of rising income inequality changed over time.
The organization of this paper is as follows. I begin with developing a method of decomposing a change in family income in the next section. The third section introduces the data used in the analysis. The fourth section describes the patterns of changes in the elements of family income inequality between 1969 and 1999. In the fifth section, I present the results of the decompositions that provide explanations on how each of the components of family income contributed to the changes in income inequality. In addition, I examine how the results change if alternative measures of inequality are used. The sixth section compares the results based on several different samples. Finally, the seventh section summarizes the paper.
Analytical framework
I begin with a decomposition of the total family income into several components. The definitions of the variables representing each of the components are given in Table 1 . The average annual money income of households in a given income decile, denoted by 
where H h , H s , W h , and W s stand for the mean annual hours worked and the mean hourly wage rates for employed heads and spouses, respectively; P h and P s stand for the employment rates for heads and, if married, for spouses; δ is the fraction of households in which both husband and wife are present; and finally, Q stands for the mean incomes from other sources. For the measure of income inequality, I use the difference in the log of average family income between two income deciles, say, the top and the bottom income deciles (denoted by N * ). That is,
Using an approximation, N * can be decomposed as shown in Equation (1) , where the asterisk denotes the difference in the logs of a variable in the top and bottom deciles of families. For example,
). Equation (1) can then be rewritten as
where denotes the weight of each of the three income sources. For example,
indicates the earnings of heads as a proportion of the total average family income.
It is possible to decompose the change in N * over time, say, between 1969 and 1999, by differentiating Equation (2) totally to obtain
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (3) represents the rate of change in the disparity in average hours worked by family heads in the top and bottom deciles, weighted by the relative share of family income derived from the earnings of the head. The estimate of this term indicates the relative contribution of the change in average working hours of heads to the rise in the measure of income inequality between 1969 and 1999. Likewise, the second and third terms show the relative contributions of changes in hourly wages and in the employment rate of heads, respectively. On the other hand, the fourth term represents the effect of changing weight, that is, the relative importance of earnings of family heads as a source of income. If the earnings of family heads were more unequally distributed than other sources of income, an increase in the share of earnings of the head in the total family income would produce a rise in the magnitude of inequality. It should be noted that I did not follow up the individual families over time using this method. I only compared the families in a particular income group today to those families in that income category in the past, who are not necessarily the same. The question to be answered using the method above is why the difference in income between the rich and poor families today was much greater than it was 30 years ago. More specifically, this study examines how the gaps in wages, employment, hours, other incomes, and family structure between today's rich and poor families differ from the disparities in these same factors between the same groups in the past. The framework used in this study, however, provides only limited hints as to why the distribution of these family income components changed over time. For instance, the rise in the disparities in employment and hours of heads and spouses may have resulted from the behavioral responses of individual families to changes in economic conditions such as changing wage structure, which cannot be analyzed in the present framework. However, I believe it is important to understand first what happened even if it cannot be fully explained why it happened.
Data
The balance of this paper is based on data from the Annual Demographic Files on the March Current Population Surveys (CPS hereafter) for the survey years 1969 to 2001. Since most of the calculations below are based on annual earnings, weeks worked, and usual hours of work per week in the years before the survey, this study covers the calendar years 1968 to 2000. The secular rise in the family income inequality started in the late 1960s and continued thereafter. Accordingly, I chose four benchmark years, namely, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999 to study long-term changes. The patterns of changes in the determining factors of family income inequality may be sensitive to the choice of the initial and end years (see, for example, Haveman 1996) so I averaged three years of data centered on the benchmark years to mitigate possible business cycle effects. Thus, the averages I report for 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999 are actually based on the 1968 -70, 1978 -80, 1988 -90, and 1998 The main unit of analysis used in this study is the family, which is composed of two or more related persons. I limited the sample to families whose heads were in their working ages (between 18 and 64). 8 However, alternative sample selection may provide different results. 9 The three decades under study have witnessed a great transformation in living arrangements. As the fraction of non-family households greatly increased, the population covered by the sample should have diminished. Moreover, the working ages chosen here (18 to 64) may not be fully comparable across different cohorts because of the secular rise in college attendance and early retirement over the three decades. The increase in the proportion of female-headed families was also remarkable. For these reasons, in addition to the primary sample being composed of families, I use several alternative samples covering different populations for testing the sensitivity of the result to the selection of the sample (see the sixth section).
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Using these data sets, I calculated the components of the mean family income for each income decile as explained above. The incomes and earnings were all converted into 1982-1984 dollars. The employment rate for family heads (spouses) was calculated by dividing the number of those who worked at least one week last year by the number of all families for each income decile. I calculated the annual hours of work by multiplying weeks and usual hours worked per week last year. 10 I then estimated the annual hours worked for those employed in each income decile. 11 Other income (Q) was calculated as the difference between the average total household income and the average earnings of heads and spouses. Thus, it includes earnings of other household members and non-labor incomes. 12
Changes in the components of household income, 1969-1999
Figures 1 to 7 and the Table A1 in the Appendix present the estimate of the mean total family income and each of the components of the mean family income for each income decile for 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999 . It is well documented that measures of family income inequality increased since the late 1960s and accelerated in the 1980s. The income gap between the top and bottom income deciles, the primary measure of household income inequality employed in this study, confirm the long-term rise in family income inequality. As presented in Figure 1 , the average income of the top 30% families increased rapidly, while the incomes of low-and middle-income families stagnated or even declined. During the three decades, the average income of the top 10% families increased by 57% as compared to a 40% decline among the families in the bottom income decile. In particular, the 1990s witnessed the most dramatic rise in the income disparity between rich and poor families. The average income of the richest 10% families increased by 30 percentage points, whereas the income of all families grew by about 6 percentage points. As a consequence, the difference in the log of the total family income between the top and bottom deciles, denoted by N * above, increased by 0.96; more than half the increase (0.5355) was attributed to the change between 1989 and 1999. Figure 2 suggests that shifts in the hourly wage rates of family heads (W h ) was probably not a powerful cause of the rise in family income inequality until the 1990s. Wages for family heads slightly fell or remained unchanged for low-and middle-income families between 1969 and 1999. Although the wages for the families in the top three income deciles slightly increased, the difference between high-and low-income families was relatively small. On the other hand, the average wages for the top 10% families greatly increased during the 1990s in sharp contrast with the relatively stable wage rates for the families in the rest of the income distribution. Thus, the wage change should have increased the income inequality to a greater extent during the 1990s than it did in the previous two decades.
It is well documented in other studies how the labor supply of men and women with different earnings potentials has changed over time (Juhn 1992 Gottschalk 1993; Juhn and Murphy 1997). The present paper provides a picture of longterm changes in the elements of labor supply for a more broadly defined population, namely all families. The overall employment rate for family heads (P h ) fell substantially over the three decades under investigation, particularly during the 1970s and the 1990s. The decline in P h was much greater for lower income families than for higher income families. For instance, P h fell 14 percentage points for the bottom income decile and declined by 5 percentage points or less for the top three income deciles ( Figure 3 , Table A1 , row 3). Changes in annual hours worked for family heads (H h ) exhibit a similar pattern. The decline in hours was particularly pronounced for the bottom two income deciles, especially from 1969 to 1989 ( Figure 4 , Table A1 , row 4). We can predict from these patterns that uneven changes in P h and H h should have been at least partly responsible for the rise in the family income inequality.
The fraction of husband and wife families (δ) among families in the lower half of the income distribution fell considerably between 1969 and 1979 and rebounded during the next decades, except for the lowest income decile. As consequence, the decline in δ between 1969 and 1989 was visible only for the lowest income decile. Between 1989 and 1999, δ sharply declined for all families, but more severely for lower-income families. Meanwhile, δ remained relatively stable for the top two income deciles (row 9 of Table A1 ). In sum, family structure had changed in direction to increase the family income inequality, especially between 1969 and 1979 and between 1989 and 1999 . It should be kept in mind that these statistics disguise dramatic changes in the living arrangement and rising instability of the family because non-family households were excluded from the sample.
Over the period under study, the hourly wage for the employed spouse (W s ) increased much faster for high-income families than for lower-income families ( Figure 5 ). The disparity in the wage growth of spouses between rich and poor families was more pronounced than that of heads of families. For example, W s for the top income decile more than doubled between 1969 and 1999, whereas W s for the bottom three deciles changed a little. This indicates that the change in W s should be a major source of the rise in the family income inequality over the three decades since 1969.
As the female labor-force participation rate increased, the proportion of employed spouses (P s ) rose considerably. As illustrated in Figure 6 , the rise in P s was generally greater among middle-and high-income families. For the top income decile, P s increased from 59% to 88% between 1969 and 1999. On the other hand, there was no gain for wives in the lowest 10% families. This result indicates that the labor-force participation of spouses changed in direction to magnify the family income inequality. The average annual hours of work of employed spouses (H s ) increased for families in all income deciles (Figure 7 ). In particular, wives in middle-income families increased the hours of work the most. This outcome suggests that the effect of change in H s on the family income inequality, if any, should be small in magnitude.
Decomposition of the changes in family income inequality
The patterns of changes over time in the components of household income allow us to predict the direction of their contributions due to shifts in household income inequality. For instance, the hourly wages of heads should have been a minor factor that caused the decline in household income inequality between 1969 and 1989. Furthermore, changes in the employment rate and the hours of work for heads should have substantially contributed to the widening of the income gap between the rich and the poor for the period under study. In the following two sections, I analyze in detail how changes in each of the components contributed to the shifts in the household income inequality. I begin with a baseline decomposition of the changes in the difference in the log of the total family income between the top and bottom income deciles based on Equation (3). Table 2 presents the result of a baseline decomposition in which the samples of families headed by a head aged 18 to 64 were included, and the difference in the log of income between the top and bottom income deciles was used as the measure of family income inequality. For the entire period between 1969 and 1999, in which the difference in the log of family income between the top and bottom deciles increased by 0.96, changes in other incomes (Q) and labor supply of heads and spouses (P h , H h , and P s ) explained more than half of the rise in the measure of family income inequality (see final column of Table 2 ).
Baseline decomposition
The increased inequality in other incomes (Q) accounted for 29% of the rise in the family income inequality between 1969 and 1999. Although Q accounts for a relatively small fraction of the total family income, the difference in Q between the high-and low-income families increased rapidly during the three decades to produce a strong impact on the rise in the overall family income inequality. 13 As shown below, the effect of the change in other incomes was completely explained by the relative decline of other incomes of low-income families. Changes in employment and hours worked explained another 28% of the rise in the family income inequality between 1969 and 1999. In particular, changes in the hours worked and the employment rate for heads (which explained 13% and 9%, respectively, of the increase in the income disparity) 262 C. Lee 1968 , 1969 , 1970 , 1978 , 1979 , 1980 , 1988 , 1989 See text for the methods of computation. 'Share' provides the percentage of the increase in the measure of family income inequality explained by the variable.
were major contributing factors, with a change in the employment rate of spouses accounting for another 7% of the increase in the measure of inequality.
It is striking that structural changes in wages, largely regarded as the major culprit for the increase in income inequality, explain less than a quarter of the rise in the measure of family income inequality. The effects of the wage changes of heads and spouses were almost equally important. Changing family structure, as measured by the fraction of families with both husband and wife (δ), was a non-trivial factor in the rise in family income inequality. It accounted for 11% of the widening of the income gap between the top and bottom income deciles.
Changes in the composition of the income sources accounted for the remaining 16% of the rise in the measure of inequality. First, the rise in the share of spouses' earnings ( s ) strongly increased the measure of income inequality (see Table 2 , row 10). Since the percentage of families with married couples and the employment rate of spouses as well as the mean earnings of employed spouses were much lower for lower-income families than for richer families, the disparity in spouses' earnings was much greater than the inequality in heads' earnings or other incomes. During the three decades under study, the share of spouses' earnings in the total family income increased from 13% to 31%. About two-thirds of the effects of the increased share of spouses' earnings were offset by the countervailing effects of the decline of the share of heads' earnings and the increase in the relative size of other incomes. 14 The first three columns of Table 2 present the results of the decomposition for each of the three decades. According to the measure of inequality used in this study, the growing family income inequality accelerated during the 1990s. The upsurge in the income gaps between the top and bottom income deciles between 1989 and 1999 was greater than the rise in the measure of inequality during the previous two decades combined.
The relative contribution of each of the components of family income considerably differed by decade. First, the relative importance of changing labor supply, especially the employment rate for heads, declined over time. During the 10 years between 1969 and 1979, changes in employment and hours of heads and spouses accounted for nearly two-thirds of the increase in the measure of income inequality. The proportion explained by changing labor supply decreased to 33% in 1979-89, and to 28% by 1989-99. On the other hand, the relative importance of the effect of changing wages increased over time, that is, the percentage of the rise in the measure of inequality accounted for by wage changes was 10% in the 1970s, 4% in the 1980s, and 39% in the 1990s. The relative impact of changing distribution of other incomes (Q) decreased over time.
Right tail versus left tail of the income distribution
A widening of the income disparity between the top and bottom income deciles could have resulted from either a faster growth of income of the richest 10% families or a deterioration of the position of the lowest 10% families, in comparison with the families in the middle. Likewise, the relative contribution of each of the components of family income could have come from either the left or the right tail of the income distribution. Similar decompositions, based on Equation (3), were conducted separately for the differences in the log of income between the top 10th and the average, and between the average and the bottom 10th families. The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 .
The results suggest that 70% of the increase in the income difference between the top and bottom 10th families were produced by the deterioration of the position of the poorest 10th relative to the families in the middle. During the decade between 1969 and 1979, in particular, the widening of income disparity between the rich and poor families was completely explained by the relative decline of the bottom 10th families. This indicates that the sharp rise of the family income inequality was largely due to the collapse of low-income families.
For the upper half of the income distribution, wage change was the dominant cause of the increase in the measure of family income inequality. Changing heads' wages accounted for more than half of the increase in the difference between the incomes of the top 10% families and the average income, while the changing wages of spouses explained another 28%. The change in the proportion of families with both husband and wife was the other major factor for the rising income inequality. The change in other incomes did not increase the measure of family income inequality. Moreover, the overall effects of changes in labor supply and the composition of income sources were trivial.
In sharp contrast to the results for the upper half, changes in labor supply and other incomes were the principal causes of the growing distance between the poor and middle-income families for the lower half of the income distribution. Shifts in employment and hours worked accounted for 36% of the increase in the difference between the incomes of the lowest 10th families and the average income. Changes in other income accounted for 38%, indicating that the effect of change in other income reported in Table 2 was completely explained by the relative decline of other incomes of low-income families. Only 8% of the increase in the measure of inequality was attributable to wage changes. Changes in the composition of income sources and (12) Sources: Computed based on CPS data for 1968 , 1969 , 1970 , 1978 , 1979 , 1980 , 1988 , 1989 See text for the methods of computation. 'Share' provides the percentage of the increase in the measure of family income inequality explained by the variable. (12) the proportion of families with both husband and wife explained 12% and 11%, respectively, of the rising income disparity between the families in the middle and those at the bottom.
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Income disparity between second and ninth deciles
The difference in the log of income between the top and bottom 10% families, used above as the measure of household income inequality, may not deliver the full picture of changing inequality. By focusing on the gaps between the richest and the poorest in particular, it failed to capture any changes in the middle of the income distribution. In order to supplement this weakness at least partially, a similar decomposition method was applied to the difference in income between the second and ninth income deciles. The results are reported in Table 5 .
The rise in the difference in the log of income between the second and ninth deciles between 1969 and 1999 (0.5477) was about 60% in magnitude of the increased income gap between the highest and lowest 10% families. The relative importance of the effect of each income component was considerably different between the two results. Changes in wages, especially of heads, were more powerful causes of the widening income disparity when the top and bottom 10% families were excluded from the decomposition. Wage changes alone explained 38% of the rise in the measure of income inequality. On the other hand, the influence of labor supply changes was smaller for the income inequality between the families in the second and ninth deciles. This pattern was generally true for each of the three decades, but was more clearly observed for 
Sensitivity of the result to the choice of population
Although the population chosen above, that is, families headed by working age persons, was widely used in the study of income distribution and poverty, there is no standard rule to select the sample to study. The pattern of living arrangement and the family structure have dramatically changed over the three decades under investigation. Thus, the populations compared above between 1969 and 1999 may be different in various aspects, and a change in the population covered by the study may lead to a different conclusion. I repeated the same decomposition using several alternative samples covering different populations to examine whether the result obtained above is sensitive to the choice of population.
I begin by analyzing a broader population, that is, all households including nonfamily households. The proportion of non-family households increased from 19% in 1969 to 31% in 2000 (US Bureau of the Census 1996, No. 66; US Bureau of the Census 2004, No. 56). We thus tend to look at increasingly narrow segments of the population over time by focusing on family households. Given that non-family households were overrepresented in lower-income households, we may have a different result if this broader sample was used.
The first column of Table 6 presents the result. The estimated measure of the rise in the family income inequality (0.9576) and the relative size of each component's contribution to the increase in income inequality were remarkably similar to the results based on the sample of families reported in Table 2 . The only notable difference was the relatively greater contribution of the change in the employment rate for heads (13%) where all households are concerned.
The next issue to be addressed with regard to the choice of the sample is the age range of family heads. Although persons aged 18 to 64 were largely regarded as the workingage population, this is not fully comparable across different times for various reasons. First, college enrollment considerably increased between 1970 and 2000, diminishing the proportion of young family heads covered by this study (because the families whose heads were enrolled in school were excluded). 15 Second, the typical retirement age has diminished as early retirement (defined as leaving the labor force permanently at an age younger than 65) became increasingly common. 16 To reduce the effects of the change in the typical working age, I restricted the sample to families headed by persons aged 25 to 55. The result of the decomposition based on this sample is reported in the second column of Table 6 . Although the results based on all families headed by prime-age persons are not perfectly matched, their implications are not much different from each other. Similar to the result for all families, changing labor supply explained about a third of the increase in the measure of the family inequality; wage changes accounted for another 31%. Notable differences were the relatively small effects of the shift in the composition of income sources and the large impact of changing family structure.
Another prominent change in the family structure over the last several decades was the rise of the proportion of female-headed families. In 1970, less than 11% of families were headed by women (US Bureau of the Census 1996, No. 66 1968 , 1969 , 1970 See text for the methods of computation. 'Share' provides the percentage of the increase in the measure of family income inequality explained by the variable.
the growth of female-headed families was particularly pronounced among low-income families. In consequence, female-headed families currently account for more than half of the lowest 10% families.
To eliminate the effects of changes in the working age and family structure introduced above, I decomposed the rise in family income inequality using the sample of families headed by males aged 25 to 55 (see column 3 of Table 6 ). The magnitude of the increase in the measure of income inequality between 1969 and 1999 for this sample (0.6485) was slightly greater than half of the estimate obtained from the sample of families headed by prime-age persons (1.2390) and about two thirds of the estimate for all families headed by working age persons (0.9600). This result indicates that the growing instability of the family is a major factor for the rise in family income inequality. The relative contribution of each of the components of family income was also quite different. In particular, wage change was the most powerful factor for the increase in income inequality among the families headed by prime-age males. However, similar to the results for the full sample, labor supply changes explained 31% of the rise in the measure of income inequality.
Conclusions
This study has estimated what fraction of the rise in family income inequality in the United States between 1968 and 2000 was accounted for by the change in each of the 268 C. Lee family income components such as wages, employment, hours worked by family heads and spouses, family structure, and other income. The increased disparities in other income (Q) accounted for 29% of the rise in the difference in income between the top 10% and bottom 10% families. Changes in employment and hours worked explained 28% of the rise in family income inequality between 1969 and 1999. More specifically, changes in the hours worked and the employment rate of family heads explained 13% and 9%, respectively, of the increase in the income disparity, while change in the employment rate of spouses accounted for another 7%. Structural changes in wages, largely regarded as the major culprit for the increase in income inequality, explained less than a quarter of the rise in the measure of family income inequality. Changing fractions of families with both husband and wife accounted for 11% of the widening of the income gap between the top and bottom income deciles. Changes in the composition of the income sources explained the remaining 16% of the rise in the measure of inequality.
The relative contribution of each of the components of family income considerably differed by decade. In particular, the relative importance of the effect of changing labor supply, especially that of the employment rate for heads, declined over time. On the other hand, a much greater percentage of the rise in family income inequality during the 1990s was explained by wage changes as compared to the previous two decades.
The sharp rise of the family income inequality was largely due to the collapse of low-income families. About 70% of the increase in the income difference between the top and bottom 10th families was produced by the deterioration of the position of the poorest 10% relative to the average household. For the upper half of the income distribution, wage changes were the dominant causes of the increase in the measure of family income inequality. In sharp contrast, for the lower half of the income distribution, changes in labor supply and other incomes were the principal causes of the growing distance between the poor and middle-income families.
If the families in the second and ninth income deciles were compared, changes in wages, especially of heads, was the more powerful cause of the widening income disparity. The results of decompositions based on alternative samples (all households including families and single householders, families headed by prime-age persons, and families headed by prime-age males), although considerably different from one another, provided generally similar implications. It is especially notable that changing labor supply explained about a third of the rise in the measure of family income inequality between 1969 and 1999 (28% to 36%, respectively), no matter which sample was chosen.
The most striking result of this study is that wage changes of heads and spouses explained only a modest fraction of the widening of the income gap between the top and bottom 10% families. Prior to the 1990s, in particular, less than 10% of the rise in the measure of family income inequality resulted from wage changes. On the other hand, changing employment and hours exerted stronger impacts on the increase in family income inequality than was previously thought. The influence of changing labor supply was particularly powerful prior to 1990, accounting for 63% and 33% of the rise in family income inequality during the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. In particular, the relative decline in the employment rate and hours worked among poor householders was the single most important cause of the collapse of the families at the bottom of income distribution between 1969 and 1989.
Along with changing employment and hours of work, the relative decline in other income of low-income families was an important cause of the rise in the disparity in family income. Since the other income of the lowest 10th families was largely composed of transfer income, the relative decline of their other income may have been produced in part by changes in government income distribution policy. It may also be partly attributable to the rise in the capital incomes of middle-and high-income families since the mid-1970s. 17 Another interesting result is that the 1990s was distinct from the previous two decades in terms of the magnitude and the mechanisms of the rise in family income inequality. The rise in the measure of family income inequality during the 1990s was more than twice as large as that of the previous two decades combined. In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, during which the rise in family income inequality was largely produced by the relative decline of bottom 10th families, about two thirds of the increase in family income inequality during the 1990s resulted from the faster income growth of the richest 10% families compared with entire families. Wage changes were a more important factor for the rise in family income inequality in the 1990s than in the previous two decades. These peculiar features of the 1990s may be explained by the dramatic increase in the wages of the top 10% salary earners since the mid-1990s (Piketty and Saez 2001) .
The results of this study suggest that the rise in the income disparity between rich and poor families over the last three decades could not simply be explained by the growing wage inequality as has been highlighted. The relative declines in employment, hours worked, and non-labor incomes of the families at the bottom were more important factors for the rise of family income inequality, especially prior to 1990. The rise in the number of single-parent families was another non-trivial factor. Given that changes in employment, hours worked, non-labor incomes, and family structure had particularly strong impacts on the relative decline of the families at the bottom, these factors should be considered more seriously than wage changes in addressing poverty issues that could be more crucial for the wellbeing of the people than inequality per se.
C. Lee
6. This study estimated a counterfactual measure of the family income inequality for 1989 that would have resulted had the employment and hours distribution as of 1969 remained unchanged. 7. He ranked individuals into earnings quintiles according to family earnings rather than individual earnings, and then calculated counterfactual mean earnings for each earnings quintile, assuming no change in the mean employment rate and hours of work in each earnings group. 8. I excluded a small number of families in which wives were recorded as the head of family because their husbands reside elsewhere while remaining married. The number of families covered by the sample for each year is 32,964 (1968), 31,499 (1969), 32,016 (1970), 33,842 (1978), 39,839 (1979), 39,842 (1980), 29,790 (1988), 32,316 (1989), 32,101 (1990), 31,188 (1998), 31,431 (1999), and 30,194 (2000) . 9. Karoly (1993) provided a good example of comparing the patterns of changing inequality based on different populations. Haveman (1996) noted that the increase in the variance of hours worked accounted for a much larger proportion of the rise in the variance of the log of male earnings for all males than it did for employed male workers. 10. For this computation, the data from the 1968-75 surveys were not comparable with those of the later surveys.
For the early years, weeks worked last year were reported only on a bracketed basis, and usual hours worked per week last year were not reported. In order to impute the continuous values for weeks worked last year, I divided the data from the 1976-78 surveys into cells according to weeks worked and used the cell means for weeks worked as the corresponding week's data for the early years. 11. For this calculation, the following method was used. First, I multiplied hours worked in the week prior to the survey and weeks worked for those who worked at least one hour last week. This estimate of annual hours worked, denoted by H LW , should differ from the actual annual hours, H LY , because (1) those who worked last week are not the same people as those who worked last year, and (2) Table, did not differ much from one income decile to another.
More importantly, the average family size of each income decile changed over time in a similar manner. Therefore, the patterns of changes in the family income components and their relative contributions to the rise in family income inequality did not change much when the average per capita family income was considered. 13. In 1999, for example, Q was 6196 dollars, which was about 17% of the mean total family income. Between 1969 and , the rate of increase in Qwas much higher for the families in the top income decile (31 percentage points) than for the lowest income decile (−44%). 14. The share of heads' earnings fell from 71% in 1969 to 52% in 1999. 
